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wage-setting systems. Using quantile regression, we also find that wages are more dispersed 
under firm-level bargaining compared to more centralized wage-setting systems. 
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Several advanced countries have undergone a process towards more decentralized wage
bargaining in the labor market over the past decades. A comparison between the 1970s and
the 1990s reveals that not a single OECD country moved towards centralization, whereas a
considerable number moved towards greater decentralization according to OECD (2004).
In many countries, this movement has been accompanied by a steady decline in union
densities, while the extent of bargaining coverage has typically been unchanged. Decen-
tralization of collective bargaining may have important implications for wage formation
and wage dispersion in particular, but only scarce microeconometric evidence exists to
document such e⁄ects.
The principal aim of this paper is to empirically examine the movement of decen-
tralization in wage bargaining in terms of its impact on wage dispersion. From a theo-
retical standpoint decentralization may lead to increased wage dispersion because ￿rm-
and individual-speci￿c characteristics are more likely to enter the wage contracts, while
under centralized bargaining egalitarian union preferences are easier to accomplish.1 Obvi-
ously, changes in wage dispersion may have important direct welfare implications through
increased income inequality, but there may also be more indirect consequences. A move-
ment away from a standard wage rate applying to all workers means that wages are more
in accordance with individual productivity and local conditions, which tends to reduce
misallocation, ine¢ ciencies and unemployment in the labor market. In contrast to this
view, Moene and Wallerstein (1997) argue that centralized bargaining tends to bolster
expanding progressive industries and hamper declining ones, while local bargaining allows
less productive plants to reduce wages and remain in operation. Also, when risk-averse
individuals face uncertainty about their position in the income distribution, unions may
improve welfare by compressing the wage structure, see Agell and Lommerud (1992). In
any case, it is clear that the link between bargaining level and wage dispersion is important
for welfare, and a ￿rst step should be to empirically assess the extent to which decentral-
1See e.g. Farber (1978) and Booth (1984) for theoretical models explicitly handling the role of wage
dispersion in union preferences.
2ization increases wage dispersion. Cross country evidence suggests that centralized wage
setting generally leads to less wage dispersion (see e.g. Rowthorn 1992, Wallerstein 1999
or OECD 2004), but studies based on cross section micro data do not reach unanimous
conclusions (this literature is reviewed in the next section). In this paper we employ
a matched worker-￿rm data set from Denmark covering a period of decentralization of
wage bargaining. Our data allow us to assess whether a change in the centralization level
of wage bargaining a⁄ects wages within job spells, and how these wage changes are dis-
tributed across workers depending on characteristics such as educational attainment and
labor market experience. We also directly estimate how decentralization a⁄ects the wage
distribution using quantile regression.
Another aspect of decentralization is its impact on wage levels. A number of di⁄erent
explanations for higher mean wages under ￿rm level bargaining may be put forth. First,
higher wages at the local level may be due to rent sharing, see e.g. Blanch￿ ower, Oswald
and Sanfey (1996). Second, ￿rms with local bargaining may encourage workers to work
harder by o⁄ering higher wages through e¢ ciency wage considerations, see e.g. Akerlof
and Yellen (1988). Third, ￿rm level bargaining may involve higher wages and lower
employment due to insider-outsider e⁄ects, see Fitzenberger and Franz (1999). Fourth,
it may be argued that decentralization of collective bargaining makes it less likely that
unions internalize externalities of many di⁄erent types, see Calmfors (1993). For example,
decentralized wage increases may lead to higher product prices, thus increasing the cost of
inputs for other ￿rms. Such externalities may be taken into account in more centralized
bargaining settings and may induce unions to restrain their wage demands. However,
Calmfors and Dri¢ ll (1988) argue that the relationship between centralization and wage
outcomes is hump shaped. At the national, level unions internalize externalities and
moderate their wage demands, but at the ￿rm level they also restrain wage demands
because higher wages lead to higher product prices and lower demand for the goods
produced by the ￿rm, thereby reducing employment in the ￿rm. At the industry level
neither of these mechanisms are present to the same extent, and so unions negotiate
for higher wages at this level. For open economies Danthine and Hunt (1994) show
3that the hump shaped relationship between wages and centralization level ￿ attens out
as product market competition increases, and so the room left open for diverging wage
policies narrows. Thus, the prediction concerning the impact of decentralization on wage
levels is less clear-cut and is ultimately an empirical question.
We have access to a very rich longitudinal data set for private sector workers in the
Danish labor market. The Danish labor market is interesting to study because four di⁄er-
ent wage-setting systems, representing three di⁄erent levels of centralization, coexist, and
so their in￿ uence on wage formation may readily be compared. First, in one segment of
the labor market wages are negotiated at sector level for all workers ￿this is the so-called
standard-rate system. Clearly, the scope for wages to re￿ ect individual productivity is
limited under this system. Second, a considerable part of the labor market has bargaining
between unions and employers at the sector level over a contractual wage, which is ac-
companied by local bargaining at the ￿rm level over an individual wage supplement (the
minimum-pay and minimum-wage systems). In this case, wages may be in more accor-
dance with individual quali￿cations due to the local-level bargaining. Third, a segment
of the labor market has no centrally negotiated contractual wage, and wages are entirely
determined at the ￿rm level. Importantly, our data set covers a period where many labor
market segments changed wage-setting system towards bargaining at more decentralized
levels. In particular, the importance of the segment with only ￿rm-level bargaining has
increased during our sample window.
The longitudinal dimension of the data is crucial for two main reasons. First, identi-
￿cation of the e⁄ects of decentralization on wage dispersion is greatly facilitated by the
change of wage-setting system over time for many workers. Second, in contrast to the
existing empirical evidence, longitudinal data allows us to control for unobserved hetero-
geneity. Our empirical analysis follows two di⁄erent approaches. We ￿rst run standard
Mincerian wage regressions with ￿xed e⁄ects within jobs. We ￿nd that wages are on
average higher under ￿rm-level bargaining and that the return to skills is higher at the
local level. Second, we also apply a recently developed panel data quantile regression
method since this, in a very transparent way, illustrates the impact of wage-setting sys-
4tems in di⁄erent quantiles of the wage distribution. We ￿nd that decentralization of
wage bargaining increases wage dispersion, i.e., wages are most dispersed under the most
decentralized system ￿￿rm-level bargaining.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie￿ y reviews the existing empirical
literature on unions and the dispersion of wages. Section 3 describes the institutional
framework for wage bargaining in Denmark. This section also summarizes the aggregate
development towards more decentralized wage bargaining in Denmark in the 1990s. Sec-
tion 4 describes the data set, section 5 outlines the empirical framework, and the results
are presented in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Unions and the dispersion of wages
The impact of unions on wage formation and wage dispersion is a subject that has long
attracted the attention of economists. There exists a large literature assessing the wage
di⁄erential between union and non-union workers and the impact of unions on wage in-
equality (see e.g. Freeman 1980 for an early exposition and Card et al. 2004 for a more
recent review). This is an interesting issue in Anglo-Saxon countries, where it makes
sense to focus on union membership of the individual worker. However, in most conti-
nental European countries the relevant measure is the centralization level of bargaining,
because even in countries with low union densities, bargaining agreements are typically
extended to the majority of the workforce. In this section we brie￿ y review the existing
microeconometric evidence of the impact of the bargaining level on wage formation.
One of the ￿rst studies of the subject is Dell￿ Aringa and Lucifora (1994), who inves-
tigated the Italian metal-mechanical industry with establishment survey data from 1990.
They found a positive wage di⁄erential in ￿rms where unions are recognized for local bar-
gaining as compared to ￿rms where only the national bargaining wages apply. In addition,
they ￿nd that ￿rm-level bargaining raises wages more for white collar workers than for
blue collar workers.
These results are consistent with a more recent paper by Card and de la Rica (2006),
5who study the e⁄ect of ￿rm-level contracting relative to regional or national contracts in
Spain. They use the European Structure of Earnings Survey (ESES) from 1995, which
is a matched worker-￿rm data set with information on whether the worker belongs to
a multi-employer bargaining regime or a regime with single-employer bargaining (￿rm-
level bargaining). They show that there is a positive wage premium of 5-10% associated
with single-employer bargaining. Interestingly, they also ￿nd that the premium is higher
for more highly-paid workers. They take this as weak evidence of a more ￿ exible wage
structure under ￿rm-level bargaining.
Two other recent contributions use the ESES data set for 1995 to examine the e⁄ect
on wage dispersion. Dell￿ Aringa and Pagani (2007) perform a variance decomposition
of the ESES data for Italy, Belgium, and Spain. In Italy and Belgium there is no clear
e⁄ect of single-employer bargaining on wage dispersion, while for Spain, consistently with
Card and de la Rica (2006), they ￿nd a small positive e⁄ect. In addition to the variance
decomposition, Dell￿ Aringa and Pagani estimate a quantile regression model separately
for each wage-setting system to compute wage inequality measures conditional on the
di⁄erent explanatory variables. Thus, when taking observable heterogeneity into account,
they ￿nd that, if anything, single-employer bargaining tends to decrease wage dispersion
in Italy and Belgium, while the opposite is true for Spain.
Plasman et al. (2007) also perform a variance decomposition exercise and ￿nd for
Belgium, Denmark, and Spain that decentralized bargaining increases the mean wage.
Furthermore, single-employer bargaining increases the dispersion of wages in Denmark
and Belgium while it decreases the wage dispersion in Spain, which is in contrast to the
￿ndings of Card and de la Rica (2006) and Dell￿ Aringa and Pagani (2007).
Using a cross section data set for 1991, Hartog et al. (2002) investigate the impact of
di⁄erent bargaining regimes on wages in the Netherlands, and they ￿nd that mean wages
under ￿rm-speci￿c and industry-level contracting are very similar. They also observe
workers in ￿rms with no collective bargaining and in ￿rms with mandatory extensions of
an industry agreement, and wage di⁄erentials between regimes were found to be no larger
than 4%. Also in terms of wage dispersion modest di⁄erences are found among the four
6regimes, but ￿rm-speci￿c bargaining yields the greatest residual variation of wages.
Comparing contractual wages and actual wages, Cardoso and Portugal (2005) ￿nd for
Portugal a substantial wage cushion with industry averages of 20-50% of the contractual
wages. From tobit regressions it is found that the e⁄ects of worker and ￿rm character-
istics on contractual wages and the wage drift have the same sign, so that wage drift
stretches the wage distribution. A measure for the degree of union bargaining power is
constructed as the concentration of bargaining, and Cardoso and Portugal ￿nd that the
higher concentration is, the higher contractual wage rate and ￿by interacting this bar-
gaining power measure with worker attributes ￿the lower returns to these attributes will
be. Interestingly, the higher contractual wage rate is o⁄set by a smaller wage drift.
The wage bargaining institutions in Germany share several characteristics with the
Danish institutions, so the German case is of particular interest. Several empirical studies
have provided cross-sectional estimates of the wage e⁄ects of di⁄erent bargaining regimes
in Germany, and most tend to ￿nd that average wages and wage dispersion are higher
under ￿rm-level bargaining compared to sector-level bargaining, see Fitzenberger et al.
(2008) for a recent survey of these studies. One study for Germany deserves special men-
tion, as it estimates the impact of the wage-setting level on individual mean wages using
longitudinal data. G￿rtzgen (2006) ￿nds that unobserved heterogeneity is responsible
for much of the observed wage premia associated with industry- and ￿rm-level contract-
ing (relative to no coverage of collective bargaining contracts), but positive premia for
industry-level contracts in West Germany and for ￿rm-level contracts in East Germany
remain. While we also estimate the impact of the wage-setting level on individual mean
wages, our primary focus is on its impact on wage dispersion.
To sum up, most results indicate that wages are higher when they are negotiated at
the ￿rm level as compared to the industry level. However, this result is refuted by the
evidence from the Dutch labor market. With regard to the e⁄ects on wage dispersion
the evidence is more mixed although most results suggest that local bargaining leads to
higher wage dispersion than industry level bargaining.
A distinguishing feature is that all the mentioned studies use cross section data (except
7G￿rtzgen 2006), and a caveat applying here is that there may be unobserved di⁄erences
between workers covered by centrally and locally negotiated wage contracts. For example,
it may be argued that if ￿rms with local bargaining reward observed skills such as educa-
tion more generously, they will likely also reward unobserved skills better. Furthermore,
if local bargaining is known to imply more dispersed wages, the Roy (1951) model would
suggest that high-ability workers sort into decentralized bargaining segments. Hence, we
expect a positive correlation between local bargaining and unobserved ability, and that
appropriately controlling for unobserved heterogeneity implies smaller estimated e⁄ects
of local bargaining arrangements.
Along the same lines, risk averse workers may select into centralized bargaining systems
with more compressed wage structures, and they may be willing to pay a price in terms
of lower average wages to do so. Worker-level risk aversion is unobserved, so again failure
to control for unobserved heterogeneity may lead to upward bias in the coe¢ cient to local
bargaining systems.
With access to longitudinal data covering a period of decentralization we are in a
position to take account of unobserved heterogeneity and we may more reliably identify
the e⁄ects of decentralization since the decentralization process provides time variation
in the individual worker￿ s wage-setting system.
3 The Danish wage-setting systems
Whereas job protection is low in Denmark, the wage setting has been rather in￿ exible ￿
Denmark has been one of the OECD countries with the most compressed wage structures ￿
which in part is due to a combination of three factors. First, the bene￿t system is generous
with a high bene￿t level for low income groups and a long bene￿t period of up to four
years. Second, the Danish labor market is highly organized on both employer and worker
sides: The share of union members among all employees remained at a relatively stable
level around 75% in the 1990s, and in 2000 more than 80% were covered by a collective
agreement cf. OECD (2004). Third, wage bargaining has historically been centralized,
8but, as explained below, this has changed during the 1980s and 1990s. According to Boeri
et al. (2001) the centralization/coordination index of the bargaining system (which lies
between 0 and 1) has for Denmark dropped from 0.64 for the period 1973-1977 to 0.47
for 1983-1987 and 0.34 for 1993-1997.
The dominant bargaining parties at the national level in Denmark are the Confedera-
tion of Danish Employers (DA) and the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO). The
DA/LO area is important, not only because it covers around 45% of the private labor
market, but also because DA and LO historically have been ￿rst movers in negotiations,
thus setting the tone for the remaining part of the labor market including the public
sector. The process of decentralization started in 1989 with major organizational changes
taking place initially on the employer side. Up until the late 1980s the Confederation of
Danish Employers had been able to sustain their dominant position within the employer
side because of a rather fragmented structure with a large number of small member orga-
nizations, but in 1989 a structural reform was implemented in which several sector level
employer organizations were merged.2 The employer side pushed for this change because
increased internationalization and technological change meant that wage contracts under
the standard-rate system were not ￿ exible enough to accommodate speci￿c conditions at
the local level. As part of this process the Confederation of Danish Industry (DI) was
formed as a merger in 1991, and this signaled a clear shift of power from the national level
to the sector level.3 The wage-setting system adopted by DI was a system that combines
sector-level bargining with wage settlement at the local level (the so-called ￿minimum-
wage system￿ , see below), which implied a shift away from a centralized wage-setting
system for a considerable part of the member ￿rms. The employee side did not oppose
the decentralization movement partly because of the reasoning that labor demand might
su⁄er if ￿rms were not given more ￿ exibility, and partly because schemes for mandatory
2The number of member organizations declined from 150 in 1989 to 50 after the reform. Since then,
the number of members declined further to 13 in 2005. Several member organizations also merged on
the employee side during the 1990s and 2000s to match this development ￿the number of organizations
dropped from 30 in 1990 to 18 in 2005.
3Workers under DI accounted for more than half of the entire wage bill of the DA/LO area. Also, as
a symbol of the change of power the CEO of DA switched to become the CEO of DI.
9labor market pensions, on-the-job training, and child care leave were introduced in return.
The shift from national-level bargaining to sector-level bargaining in the early 1990s
was accompanied by a shift towards collective agreements stipulating only general condi-
tions such as working hours, rules for ￿ exible working hours and minimum wages. Increas-
ingly, wage settlements were left to the local level. In addition, the previous syncronization
of bargaining with two-year intervals was abandonded such that di⁄erences in contract
length (three and four years) were allowed. However, it is important to emphasize that
some key aspects of the bargaining process are maintained at the centralized level. First,
the right to call a con￿ ict must still be coordinated and approved at the central level.
Second, the sector-level employer orgainzations must have collective agreements approved
by DA. Finally, the o¢ cial conciliator maintains a central role in settling agreements
when the parties cannot reach a compromise themselves. Therefore, the process of decen-
tralization in Denmark is classi￿ed as ￿organized￿or ￿centralized￿decentralization, cf.
Andersen (2003).
There are four di⁄erent wage-setting systems in Denmark: First, under the standard-
rate system (￿normallłnssystemet￿ ) actual wages of workers are set by the industry col-
lective agreement and the wages are not modi￿ed at the ￿rm level. Second, under the
minimum-wage system (￿minimallłnssystemet￿ ) the wage rates set at the industry level
represent a ￿ oor and are intended to be used only for very inexperienced workers. Hence,
for other workers this wage rate is supplemented by a personal pay supplement. In prac-
tice, the personal pay supplements are often negotiated collectively with the cooperation
of the workplace union members￿representative. Third, a somewhat similar minimum-pay
system (￿mindstebetalingssystemet￿ ) exists. Rather than operating with a personal pay
supplement on top of the industry-level negotiated wage rate, the minimum-pay system
uses a personal wage. The wage rate negotiated at the industry level can be thought of
as a safety net in the form of a minimum hourly rate that must be paid under all circum-
stances. Finally, under ￿rm-level bargaining (￿uden lłnsats￿ ) the collective agreements
state that wages are negotiated at the plant or ￿rm level without any centrally bargained
wage rates.
10Table 1 shows the development in the use of these four wage-setting systems in the
DA/LO area. As is evident, there has been a trend towards more decentralized and
￿ exible wage setting, where the proportion with a standard wage rate was more than
halved. Since 1993 the most decentralized wage-setting system (￿rm-level bargaining)
has grown from a coverage of 4% to 22% in 2004. For the two two-tiered wage-setting
systems (minimum-wage and minimum-pay) we also see considerable variation over time.
In the empirical analysis below we use data for 1992-2001, so we capture the increased
importance of ￿rm-level bargaining in particular but also a shift from the standard-rate
system to the minimum-pay system in the beginning of the period.
For the purposes of this paper it is important to understand the forces behind the
change of wage-setting systems. As mentioned above, the shift from the standard-rate
system to more decentralized systems in the early 1990s was facilitated by mergers of sev-
eral smaller organizations on both the employer and employee side. A similar reasoning
may be applied to explain the change towards the most decentralized system, ￿rm-level
bargaining, for some bargaining segments in the mid 1990s. One bargaining segment
making the transition to ￿rm-level bargaining is the area covering o¢ ce clerks, which is
a relatively large segment. Several smaller member organizations were merged (both em-
ployer and employee organizations merged) and only the most decentralized wage-setting
system was deemed ￿ exible enough to accommodate the di⁄erent needs and conditions in
this new, enlarged labor market segment. It should also be mentioned that segments that
remained under the centralized standard-rate system are largely characterized by routine
tasks (e.g. transport, warehouse work, and production line work), where it makes less
sense to di⁄erentiate wages across workers.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
Our data is a matched employer-employee dataset drawn from administrative registers in
Statistics Denmark. The core of the data is the Integrated Database of Labor Market
Research (IDA), which identi￿es workers and plants consistently over time. We have
11access to information about individual characteristics for the full population of workers
for the years 1992-2001. We add to this dataset wage and income information based on
tax ￿les from the Income Register in Statistics Denmark.
The ￿rst challenge we face is to determine which collective agreement (and thus wage-
setting system) the individual worker belongs to. To accomplish this, we use detailed
industry and occupation variables. The industry code follows the NACE industry classi-
￿cation, and the occupation variable is based on the so-called DISCO code, which is the
Danish version of the ISCO-88 classi￿cation. We use the most disaggregated de￿nition
of the industry and occupation codes, i.e., the six-digit NACE code and the four-digit
DISCO code. By using these industry and occupation variables to de￿ne bargaining seg-
ments of the labor market we follow the two bargaining parties at national level, LO and
DA, who use the codes to assess the economic implications of proposals for the workers
and employers they represent. That is, we determine the bargaining segments in the same
way as DA and LO when the parties evaluate the bargaining outcome. However, the con-
struction of such bargaining segments is not completely ￿ awless. For example, a ￿rm may
wish to stay outside its industry￿ s collective agreement and we will not be able to see
this in the data. Nevertheless, we are con￿dent that our allocation of workers into bar-
gaining segments is fairly accurate since we end up with a distribution of workers across
wage-setting systems that resembles Table 1 quite closely (more on this below). We have
identi￿ed 36 bargaining segments within the DA/LO area, which corresponds to a cover-
age rate of roughly 85% of total DA/LO employment. Coupled with information about
the bargaining system each segment operates under in each year, it was straightforward
to partition all workers into the four wage-setting systems under consideration.
A long list of individual socioeconomic characteristics are used as control variables in
the analysis. We use dummies for gender, the presence of children, marriage, immigrant
status, city size (￿ Copenhagen￿ , ￿ Large city￿ , and ￿ Rural￿ ), education (￿ Unskilled￿ , ￿ Vo-
cational Education￿ , ￿ Short term higher education￿and ￿ Long term higher education￿ ),4
4The classi￿cation of education groups rely on a Danish education code that corresponds to the
International Standard Classi￿cation of Education (ISCED). ￿ Higher education￿basically corresponds
to the two highest categories (5 and 6) in the ISCED, i.e., the individual has a tertiary education.
12and experience (measured as actual labor market experience since 1964). We also con-
trol for plant size as de￿ned by the number of employees and variables measuring the
labor force composition at plant level. Furthermore, in all regressions we include a full
set of industry dummies (25 industries) interacted with a full set of year dummies to
capture di⁄erences in business conditions across industries (e.g., demand shocks, import
penetration, technological change, etc.).
The hourly wage rate is clearly an important individual level variable in the analysis,
and this wage rate is calculated as the sum of total labor income and mandatory pension
fund payments divided by the total number of hours worked in any given year. The
measure for total labor income as such is highly reliable since it comes from the tax
authorities, and the pension fund payments are also available in the registers. These
payments were introduced in the early 1990s, and have been rising throughout the sample
period, but not in a uniform manner across collective bargaining segments of the labor
market and they are therefore important to account for.
The use of annual hours to measure the wage rate is common in the literature, see e.g.
Christensen et al. (2005), but one concern is that annual hours are measured with less
precision. Information about annual hours comes from the mandatory pension fund, ATP,
which collects a relatively modest mandatory pension fund payment from all workers in
the Danish labor market. The payment depends on the number of hours worked in the
following way: i) no payment if working 0-9 hours per week, ii) 1/3 of full time payment if
working 9-18 hours per week, iii) 2/3 full time payment if working 18-27 hours per week,
and iv) full time payment if working 27 or more hours per week. The hours worked are
then imputed from knowledge about a worker￿ s ATP group. If the worker is registered
as having paid full-time ATP, then the hours worked are measured as the number of
hours corresponding to the standard 37 hour workweek. This is a rather crude measure of
hours worked, but in what follows we look only at full time workers, which helps alleviate
measurement errors arising due to the grouped nature of the variable. Still, our hours
￿ Vocational education￿is de￿ned as the ￿nal stage of secondary education encompassing programs that
prepare students for direct entry into the labor market. Thus, persons with just high school or equivalent
or less than that are classi￿ed as ￿ Unskilled￿ .
13measure does not capture overtime work, so this gives an upward bias in the measured
hourly wage rate. To the extent that this bias is related to the bargaining system it
may impact on the estimated e⁄ects of decentralization. However, for a portion of our
sample over the years 1997-2001 we have data for overtime work, so we can directly assess
whether overtime hours are nonrandomly distributed across bargaining systems. We ￿nd
that overtime work is limited and that there is no clear relationship with decentralization.
On average, workers under the standard-rate system have 36.7 hours of overtime work per
year while workers under ￿rm-level bargaining have 12.1 hours of overtime work. Workers
belonging to the two two-tiered wage-setting systems have 17.9 and 46.5 hours of ovetime
work per year, respectively. This suggests that our results are unlikely to be a⁄ected by
the issue of overtime work.
We impose the following sample selection criteria: First, we include only full-time
workers aged 25-65 years employed in one of the DA/LO bargaining segments. We leave
out the young workers to make sure our sample consists of workers who are fully attached
to the labor market and are not enrolled in the apprenticeship system or the ordinary
education system (we also leave out workers receiveing scholarships for ordinary educa-
tion). Second, to reduce the impact of measurement error we discard observations where
the hourly wage rate is unobserved, is measured with low precision according to Statistics
Denmark, or belongs to the top or bottom half percentiles of the wage distribution. Third,
we omit observations where the worker is employed by a plant with less than ￿ve employ-
ees because the smallest plants are less likely to be covered by the DA/LO agreements.
Finally, to reduce estimation time we extract a 30% random sample of the remaining
workers, which leaves us with a sample of about 1.14 million worker-year observations.
The sample version of Table 1 is Table 2. Even though we only distinguish between
36 bargaining segments and, thus, leave out a small part of the DA/LO segment, the
development in Table 2 resembles that of Table 1 quite closely. As described above,
much of the decentralization process in Denmark took place before 1992, but we still have
considerable time variation in the data.
Table 3 reports summary statistics for all observations in the data and by wage-setting
14system. Di⁄erences in observed worker characteristics across wage-setting systems are
revealed, as ￿rm-level bargaining has relatively high proportions of women, workers with
further education and high tenure, and the average plant size is biggest under this system.
In contrast, unskilled workers are disproportionately employed under the standard rate
system.
Table 4 shows means and standard deviations of log hourly wage rates in the four
di⁄erent wage-setting systems. We show both unadjusted means and standard deviations
and standardized means and standard deviations to account for di⁄erences in observed
characteristics across wage-setting systems. The standardization follows the routine by
DiNardo et al. (1996). A key insight revealed by Table 4 is that wages on average
are highest under ￿rm-level bargaining and lowest under the standard rate system. The
two intermediate wage-setting systems, minimum pay and minimum wage, have roughly
the same mean wages. These di⁄erences persist when adjusting for observable worker
characteristics, and wage dispersion is now lowest under the standard rate system.
With our longitudinal data set, identi￿cation of the impact of wage-setting system
on wages rests on the existence of workers who change wage-setting system. This can
happen for two reasons: the bargaining segment may change its system as part of the
decentralization process or the worker may change jobs. Table 5 tracks the workers in
our sample who change wage-setting system in each year. The second column shows the
total number of workers changing wage-setting system, and these numbers correspond to a
transition rate of between 3 and 14% each year. Columns 3-6 decompose the total annual
changes further. First, the entire bargaining segment can change wage-setting system
due to the decentralization process (column 3), which contributes with the majority of
transitions.5 Second, a worker can change occupation and/or industry and, thereby,
potentially also bargaining segment and wage-setting system (columns 4-6).
5It should be noticed that it is only the year in which a collective agreement is initiated that the
wage-setting system changes. For most bargaining segments this happened every second year in the
early 1990s. This explains the large number of changes in 1993, 1995, and 1997. However, some collective
agreements in 1995 and 1997 had a duration of three years. The small number of decentralization changes
in for example 1994 are workers who were in the sample in 1992 and 1994 but were out of the sample in
1993.
15Since the wage-setting system variable is constructed based on the industry and occu-
pation codes, measurement error may arise ￿in particular the occupation code is known to
be unstable within job spells in some years ￿and this may bias our estimates. In relation
to panel data estimations of a union membership e⁄ect on wages Freeman (1984) argues
that measurement error in the union membership variable will lead to a downward-biased
estimate of the e⁄ect. However, when entire bargaining segments change wage-setting
system as in our data, measurement error is less of a problem compared to the situation
where we only rely on workers changing jobs and, thereby, wage-setting systems. The data
still include job changers, however, (see columns 4-6 in Table 5) so in the empirical analy-
sis below we restrict the sample further to reduce potential problems with measurement
error. Speci￿cally, we discard all workers who change wage-setting system because of a
shift in the occupation code (column 5) unless they also change employer. This reduces
the number of wage-setting system changes due to occupation changes by approximately
90%.
As a ￿nal piece of descriptive evidence we document in Table 6 the transitions between
the four wage-setting systems caused by decentralization. Several key points emerge.
First, consistently with a process of decentralization no bargaining segments switch to
the standard rate system and no bargaining segments switch from ￿rm-level bargaining.
Second, more than half of all transitions are accounted for by bargaining segments chang-
ing from the minimum-pay system to ￿rm-level bargaining. Third, no segments change
directly from the standard-rate system to ￿rm-level bargaining. Fourth, almost 16,000
transitions are due to segments switching between the two intermediate wage-setting sys-
tems, minimum-wage and minimum-pay. As described above, these two wage-setting
systems both operate with a wage ￿ oor set at the sector level combined with subsequent
￿rm-level bargaining, and given the similar wage structure documented in Table 4, we
group these two systems together to ease interpretation in what follows.6 We label the
two intermediate wage-setting systems ￿ two-tiered bargaining￿ .
6In the wage regressions below we also entered dummies for the two intermediate wage setting systems
separately, but we found no signi￿cant di⁄erences.
165 Empirical framework
To assess the impact of decentralization on wage dispersion we employ two di⁄erent em-
pirical models. First, we run standard Mincer wage regressions with controls for observed
and unobserved heterogeneity. These will show the impact of decentralization on wage
levels and whether decentralization raises the return to skills. Second, we use panel data
quantile regression to show in a more detailed way how decentralization a⁄ects the wage
distribution.
5.1 Mean wage regression model
We assume that individual wages are determined as:
yijt = xijt￿ + ￿1FIRMLEV ELijt + ￿2TWOTIEREDijt + ’kt + ￿i + ￿ijt; (1)
where yijt is the log of the hourly wage of worker i in plant j at time t; and xijt is
the vector of individual explanatory variables. FIRMLEV EL and TWOTIERED are
dummies capturing the individual worker￿ s wage-setting system with the standard rate
system acting as the reference category.7 ’kt captures industry and time e⁄ects, i.e.,
a dummy for each combination of year t and industry k is included. We use di⁄erent
approaches to modeling the individual unobserved component ￿i: As a ￿rst speci￿cation,
￿i is simply modeled as a worker-￿xed e⁄ect. Here, identi￿cation of ￿1 and ￿2 rests
on over-time variation in the worker￿ s wage-setting system, which could be due to both
decentralization changes and job changes, cf. Table 5.
Because of the potentially endogenous nature of job changes we also estimate an
extended version of the model:
yijt = xijt￿ + ￿1FIRMLEV ELijt + ￿2TWOTIEREDijt + ’kt + ￿ij + ￿ijt: (2)
7When interpreting the coe¢ cient ￿1 it should be kept in mind that no bargaining segments switch
directly from the standard rate system to ￿rm-level bargaining, cf. Table 6.
17In this case, the unobserved component, ￿ij; is modeled as a so-called job-spell ￿xed e⁄ect
(Abowd et al. 1999). That is, a ￿xed e⁄ect is included for every combination of worker and
plant. This means that ￿1 and ￿2 are identi￿ed o⁄of variation in the wage-setting system
within a job spell, so job changes are excluded as a source of identi￿cation. Within-spell
variation in the wage-setting system is only caused by the bargaining segment changing
wage-setting system, i.e., decentralization.
Finally, for the purposes of comparison with the subsequent panel data quantile re-
gression model we also estimate a Mundlak (1978) version of equation (2), where the
unobserved component is approximated by averages of the observed covariates. An alter-
native and more ￿ exible correlated random e⁄ect estimator is proposed by Chamberlain
(1982), but in the case of an unbalanced panel it reduces to Mundlak￿ s estimator. For
the correlated random e⁄ect estimator, the unobservable component is expressed as a
restricted linear projection onto a vector of observables, denoted Sij; plus a disturbance,
vij. In particular,
￿ij = Sij￿ + vij
=   + ￿ xij￿ + ￿1FIRMLEV ELij + ￿2TWOTIEREDij + vij; (3)
where zij = 1
Tij
PTij
t=1 zijt de￿nes averages and where Tij indicates the number of years
worker i has been employed in plant j: By inserting (3) in equation (2) we get the es-
timating equation from which we (by standard random e⁄ect GLS estimation routines)
obtain the job-spell Mundlak correlated random e⁄ect estimator.
A major advantage of our empirical model vis-￿-vis the existing literature is that we
exploit time variation in the wage-setting system of the individual worker. In the job-spell
￿xed e⁄ects model (2) the time variation comes from changes in the wage-setting system
that are due to the decentralization process, while wage-setting system changes through
job moves are excluded as a source of identi￿cation. This raises the question about whether
wage-setting system changes due to the decentralization process, i.e., entire bargaining
segments changing wage-setting systems, are truly exogenous. We cannot completely rule
18out that decentralization of a bargaining segment￿ s wage-setting system is a consequence of
changes in e.g. work practices, technology, increased international competition or similar
unobserved quali￿cations of the employees that also a⁄ect wages. However, several aspects
make this less likely to be the case.
First, recall from section 3 that the process of decentralization in Denmark is labeled
￿centralized￿decentralization. In many cases decentralization happened through mergers
of smaller organizations on both the employer and employee side, and often only local
level wage-setting systems were ￿ exible enough to meet the needs of a larger labor market
segment. Also, even for the decentralized labor market segments several parts of the bar-
gaining process are maintained at the centralized level. Finally, the wage-setting systems
are de￿ned at the level of relatively large bargaining segments (36 segments in total in our
data), and the employees within a ￿rm typically belong to di⁄erent bargaining segments
and thus wage-setting systems. This centralized way of decentralizing the bargaining
system means that the scope for individual ￿rms or workers to in￿ uence the process is
relatively limited.
Second, the wage-setting system of the individual worker may in principle not be ex-
ogenous due to its group level nature (the group being the bargaining segment of the
labor market), because group level variables may be subject to the ￿re￿ ection problem￿
as described by Manski (1993). For example, we could observe a positive e⁄ect of de-
centralization on wages simply because workers forming the same group share similar
unobserved characteristics, and not because decentralization facilitates e.g. rent sharing
and e¢ ciency improvements. Again, the panel dimension of our data is useful because
any time invariant unobservables are accounted for by use of worker ￿xed e⁄ects, job-
spell ￿xed e⁄ects or correlated random e⁄ects. In addition, observed changes in e.g. labor
market experience and demographic characteristics are controlled for. Still, changes in
unobserved ability might be correlated with decentralization, which would lead to biased
estimates. However, relative to the existing cross section evidence the use of panel data
allows us to reduce the size of this problem substantially.
Third, one might worry that ￿rms experiencing unobserved shocks (for example due
19to technological change, o⁄shoring, or import penetration) will push for wages to be
negotiated at the ￿rm level. Such time-varying shocks are more likely to be correlated with
decentralization if they are industry-wide, or they hit ￿rms in entire bargaining segments.
In an attempt to capture shocks to industries of this kind we include as additional controls
a full set of industry dummies interacted with a full set of year dummies.
5.2 Wage quantile regression model
Quantile regression techniques for panel data in the presence of unobserved and correlated
components have only recently been developed. This section very brie￿ y describes the
approach and our wage quantile regression speci￿cation.
As in the linear panel model setting, there is a choice between quantile regression ￿xed
e⁄ects estimators and correlated random e⁄ects estimators. Koenker (2004) proposes a
dummy variable-based ￿xed-e⁄ects estimator for quantile regression where the problem
of a large amount of parameters to be estimated (in case of large N and small T) is
mitigated by an added penalty term and simultaneous estimation of the desired quantiles.
Unfortunately, estimation for large N and small T can be a very di¢ cult task owing to
the nature of the objective function. Because N is indeed very large in our application
the estimator unfortunately turned out to be infeasible to implement successfully.
Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) suggest a simpler correlated random e⁄ect estimator based
on the ideas of Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1984). In a simulation study, Bache
et al. (2011) show that the correlated random e⁄ects approach works well even for very
small T and is numerically feasible for very large values of N. For these reasons, we
report quantile regression estimators based on the model with correlated random e⁄ects.
It should be emphasized that, as in the linear mean model, this estimator relies heavily
on the extent to which the linear projection provides a reasonable approximation of ￿:
For example, if ￿ is a pure random e⁄ect, then the approach is very ine¢ cient, as the
included variables have poor explanatory power.
The wage quantile regression model with correlated random e⁄ects that corresponds
20to the job-spell mean wage regression speci￿cation given by equation (3) is represented
by the following two equations
q(Xijt;Sij;￿) ￿ xijt￿ (￿) + ￿1 (￿)FIRMLEV ELijt + ￿2 (￿)TWOTIEREDijt
+’kt (￿) + Sij￿(￿); (4)
yijt = q(Xijt;Sij;uijt); (5)
where Xijt = (xijt;FIRMLEV ELijt;TWOTIEREDijt;’kt) and the vector of covariates
Sij is de￿ned as in the mean wage equation. Under the assumption that Sij is a su¢ cient
vector of covariates such that uijtjXijt;Sij ￿ uniform(0;1), the quantity of interest, ￿(￿),
is identi￿ed from the data, and can be estimated by means of standard quantile regression
of y on x;FIRMLEV EL;TWOTIERED; ’kt; and S, as shown by Abrevaya and Dahl
(2008) and Bache et al. (2011).
A ￿nal comment regarding practical implementation of the sampling distribution of
coe¢ cient estimates is in order. For all of the above models, a bootstrap procedure is
the preferred method of obtaining standard errors. It is important to note that since
observations over the time dimension for worker i are not independent, the bootstrap
samples should consist of ￿blocks￿ that include all observations for the sampled cross
sectional elements. Further, as noted by Koenker (2005, page 108), sub-sampling has a
computational advantage over re-sampling with equal performance and is thus preferred
when the cross section dimension is large as in this case. For a detailed description of the
sub-sampling procedures the reader is referred to Buchinsky (1994, 1998).
6 Results
This section ￿rst presents results for the impact of wage-setting systems on mean wages.
This is followed by results for the impact on wage dispersion using the panel data quantile
regression approach.
216.1 Wage levels
While our focus is on the the impact of decentralization on wage dispersion, it is instructive
to ￿rst study how mean wages di⁄er across wage-setting systems controlling for individual
heterogeneity. Table 7 reports estimation results from a pooled OLS, worker ￿xed-e⁄ects
and job-spell ￿xed-e⁄ects models. In addition, to provide a basis for comparison with
subsequent panel data quantile regression results, we also show results for the correlated
random e⁄ects model. Included in all models are the demographic variables and human
capital variables described in section 4. However, in the ￿xed-e⁄ects models time invariant
variables drop out. A small number of workers are observed with changing educational
attainment, but these observations are dropped in the ￿xed e⁄ects models to get a cleaner
identi￿cation of interaction e⁄ects between education and wage-setting dummies.
For the pooled OLS regression in column 1 we ￿nd that wages are 6.1% higher under
￿rm-level bargaining than under the standard-rate system, where wages are negotiated at
the most centralized level. This is in line with Card and de la Rica (2006), who ￿nd that
￿rm-level contracting is associated with a 5-10% wage premium in their cross-section data
analysis for Spain. However, this quite substantial wage di⁄erential is reduced to 3.7%
once unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for through worker ￿xed e⁄ects. This clearly
suggests that it is important to control for unobserved heterogeneity, and that failure to
do so leads to an upward bias in the coe¢ cient, i.e., unobserved ability may be better
rewarded under local bargaining. We ￿nd no signi￿cant di⁄erence in mean wages between
two-tiered bargaining and the standard-rate system in the pooled OLS regression or in
the worker ￿xed-e⁄ects model.
In the worker ￿xed-e⁄ects model (2) identi￿cation of the e⁄ects of wage-setting systems
comes from over-time variation in the wage-setting system variables. This can happen
either because the bargaining segment changes its system as part of the decentralization
process or becaue the worker changes jobs from one bargaining segment of the labor market
to another. In the latter case, endogeneity may particularly be an issue as, e.g., highly paid
workers in the standard-rate system may be inclined to change to jobs under ￿rm-level
22bargaining to receive higher wages. Alternatively, low-paid or low-skilled workers may gain
from switching to jobs under the standard-rate system. As argued in the previous section,
one way to exclude this source of variation in the wage-setting system is to estimate the
job-spell ￿xed e⁄ects model instead, which is therefore our preferred speci￿cation. Column
3 of Table 7 shows that the e⁄ect of ￿rm-level bargaining now increases to 4.7%, while
the e⁄ect of two-tiered bargaining remains insigni￿cant. The estimated e⁄ect of ￿rm-level
bargaining means that job moves involving a change of wage-setting system to ￿rm-level
bargaining on average are associated with smaller wage changes than those resulting from
pure decentralization changes.8 Compared with the pooled OLS coe¢ cient, the wage
premium associated with ￿rm-level bargaining is still roughly 25% smaller in the job-
spell ￿xed e⁄ect model, which underlines the importance of controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity.
Finally, in the correlated random e⁄ects model in column (4) we ￿nd e⁄ects of wage-
setting systems that are very close to the job-spell ￿xed e⁄ects model, suggesting that
this model is a useful basis for the panel data quantile regressions below.
The time dimension in our data allows us to investigate if the estimated decentraliza-
tion e⁄ects are immediate or if it takes time for wages to adjust to a new wage-setting
system. For example, under two-tiered bargaining a wage ￿ oor is ￿rst set at the sector
level and then supplemented by local adjustments at the ￿rm level. In such systems the
more central wage negotiators may foresee that there may be additional average increases
on the top of the wage ￿ oor leading them to be more moderate in setting the ￿ oor since
they expect that this pay will subsequently be marked up by additions at the local level.
Likewise, it may take longer to set wages under ￿rm-level bargaining relative to more
coordinated and centralized systems. If this is the case, the e⁄ect of decentralization on
wages may be underestimated if the time dimension is not taken into account.
Column 1 of Table 8 extends the job-spell ￿xed e⁄ects model with variables measuring
the number of successive years the worker has been under either ￿rm-level bargaining or
8When interpreting this e⁄ect, it should be kept in mind that no bargaining segments switch directly
from the standard rate system to ￿rm-level bargaining, cf. Table 6. Instead, identi￿cation rests entirely
on decentralization changes from two-tiered bargaining to ￿rm-level bargaining.
23two-tiered bargaining. We include variables for one year, two years, three years, and four
years or more. In this approach only observations for 1995-2001 enter the sample. We
￿nd no e⁄ect of ￿rm-level bargaining in the ￿rst year, but there is an e⁄ect of 2.5% in
the second year, which rises to 3.3% in the third year under ￿rm-level bargaining. If the
worker has had wages negotiated under ￿rm-level bargaining for four or more years, the
wage premium relative to the standard-rate system is 5.8% surpassing the mean e⁄ect
estimated in Table 7. For two-tiered bargaining we ￿nd a weak positive e⁄ect of 1.5%
after three years. This provides evidence for lagged e⁄ects under this this wage-setting
system as discussed above.
The downside of using the approach in column 1 is that observations in the beginning
of our sample period are dropped, and the more time categories we include the more
observations will be dropped. One way to include more time categories (up to 7 years)
without losing too many observations is to keep all observations for which we know exactly
how many years the worker has been under ￿rm-level bargaining or two-tiered bargaining.
For worker-wage-setting system spells that begin prior to our sample period we do not
know how long time the worker has been under a given wage-setting system, and so these
left-truncated observations are discarded. In column 2 of Table 8 we use this approach
and ￿nd e⁄ects of ￿rm-level bargaining for the ￿rst three years that are close to the e⁄ects
found in column 1. It is now seen that the e⁄ect of ￿rm-level bargaining converges to
around 5% after ￿ve years under this wage-setting system. Again, we ￿nd some small
positive e⁄ects of two-tiered bargaining after three to ￿ve years.
6.2 The return to skills
Having established that wages on average are higher under ￿rm-level bargaining even
after controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity, we now turn to the question
of how decentralization a⁄ects wage dispersion. One simple way to address this question
is to study how the return to skills di⁄ers across wage-setting systems using the same
job-spell ￿xed e⁄ects model as above. If decentralization of wage bargaining leads to
24increased wage dispersion, then one would expect this is to be accomplished through a
higher return to skills the more local the level of negotiations is.
In Table 9 we interact ￿rm-level bargaining and two-tiered bargaining with dummies
for educational attainment and labor market experience groups, respectively. In column
1 we ￿nd that the return to education is higher, the more decentralized the wage-setting
system is. Recall that the education dummies are time invariant (a small number of
switchers are dropped), so the coe¢ cient on the interaction variable between ￿rm-level
bargaining and long-term higher education has the interpretation that workers with long-
term higher education who are employed under ￿rm-level bargaining receive a wage pre-
mium of 8.7% relative to similar workers employed under the standard-rate system. In
comparison, the wage premium for long term higher educated workers employed under
two-tiered bargaining is 2.9%. It is also evident that the longer the education is the higher
the decentralization wage premium will be. For example, workers with vocational edu-
cation have a wage premium of 5% if employed under ￿rm-level bargaining but no wage
premium under two-tiered bargaining.
In column 2 we interact the wage-setting system dummies with experience groups. The
direct e⁄ects of the experience groups show the in￿ uence of experience under the standard-
rate system with the reference group being between 10 and 20 years of experience. It is
seen that wage di⁄erences between experience groups under the standard-rate system are
very small and mostly insigni￿cant. Experience under two-tiered bargaining also appears
not to matter much for wages, with inexeperienced workers (0-3 years experience) being
the exception ￿they earn 2.7% lower wages than similar workers under the standard-rate
system. By contrast, again we ￿nd a higher return to skills under the most decentralized
wage-setting systems, ￿rm-level bargaining. Interestingly, the most inexperienced workers
earn 7.4% less than under the standard-rate system, while there is a ￿rm-level bargaining
wage premium of around 5% if the worker has at least 10 years of experience.
256.3 Wage dispersion
One important aspect which cannot be studied using the simple mean regressions is the
fact that the decentralization process may have uneven e⁄ects across the wage distribution
￿an issue to which we now turn. The results from applying the panel data quantile
regression techniques outlined in section 5.2 are displayed in Table 10. The table shows
results for the quantiles 0.05, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9 and 0.95. In general, the coe¢ cients
on the individual-level variables are fairly constant across the di⁄erent quantiles, but there
are also some notable exceptions. For example, women and immigrants have a higher wage
penalty in the top end of the wage distribution, which is consistent with the results of,
e.g., Albrecht et al. (2003) and Pendakur and Woodcock (2010). Also, the wage premium
from having a long tertiary education roughly doubles from the bottom to the top of the
wage distribution.
Regarding the e⁄ects of decentralization, it is found that the coe¢ cient on the dummy
for two-tiered bargaining is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero in any of the quantiles
considered. This is consistent with the zero mean e⁄ect of two-tiered bargaining found
in Table 7 and the limited interaction e⁄ects with skill variables found in Table 9. By
contrast, wages under ￿rm-level bargaining are more dispersed with the e⁄ects at the top
of the wage distribution being substantially higher than at the bottom. Interestingly, there
are signi￿cantly positive wage premia throughout the wage distribution. For example, the
e⁄ect of working under ￿rm-level bargaining compared to the standard-rate system more
than doubles from the 5th to the 95th quantile (from 3.3% to 7.2%). For the quantiles in
the middle of the wage distributions the e⁄ects of ￿rm-level bargaining are slightly higher
than the mean e⁄ect of almost 5% found in Table 7. Thus, these results support the
prediction that decentralization leads to increased wage dispersion for example because
￿rm- and individual-speci￿c characteristics are more likely to enter wage contracts, or
because egalitarian union preferences become more di¢ cult to accomplish.
267 Conclusion
Many European labor markets have undergone a process towards more decentralized wage
bargaining during recent decades. Such changes may have important welfare implications
both in terms of e¢ ciency and equity. When wages are negotiated locally at the ￿rm
level as opposed to more centralized bargaining, they are more likely to re￿ ect individual
productivity and ￿rm-speci￿c conditions. This should lead to higher returns to skills
and increased wage dispersion. Also, according to simple rent-sharing or e¢ ciency-wage
considerations mean wages should on average increase when wage-setting is decentralized
to the local level.
We use a unique register-based panel data set covering a period of decentralization in
the Danish labor market. This is crucial because the time variation allows us to identify
the e⁄ects of decentralization, as many workers have seen their wage-setting system change
as a result of the decentralization process within job spells. In contrast, the existing
literature has relied on cross section data. Also, in contrast to previous studies, the
longitudinal dimension allows us to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity. This
is critical because by doing so the wage structure di⁄erences across wage-setting systems
are substantially narrowed down.
Several theories discussed in the introduction lead to predictions about how decen-
tralization should a⁄ect wage levels and wage dispersion. The purpose of the paper has
not been to discriminate between theories of wage formation in a unionized labor market,
but we do ￿nd empirical evidence in support of the rent-sharing and e¢ ciency wage the-
ories. Even after controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity, there is still on
average a 4.7% wage premium if wages are negotiated at ￿rm-level instead of sector-level.
We also provide evidence that wages are more in accordance with individual productiv-
ity under ￿rm-level bargaining, as the return to education or labor market experience is
substantially higher under the more decentralized wage-setting systems. Finally, we also
use panel data quantile regression techniques to assess the impact of decentralization on
the wage distribution. Again, we ￿nd that decentralization of wage bargaining increases
27wage dispersion. Under the most clear-cut comparison, i.e. the e⁄ect of working under
￿rm-level bargaining compared to the standard-rate system where wages are set entirely
at the sector level, smaller wage premia are found in the lower part of the wage distrib-
ution, while larger premia are found in the upper part. For the intermediate two-tiered
bargaining systems wages are not more dispersed than under the standard-rate system.
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32Table 1: Private sector wage-setting systems 1989-2004
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 2000 2004
Standard-rate 34 19 16 16 16 15 16
Minimum-wage 32 37 13 12 21 23 27
Minimum-pay 30 40 67 61 46 42 35
Firm-level bargaining 4 4 4 11 17 20 22
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Danish Employers￿Federation (DA).
Table 2: Private sector wage-setting systems 1992-2001, data
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Standard-rate 16.1 13.5 13.9 12.5 12.7 12.3 11.9 12.0 11.6 11.8
Minimum-wage 30.0 17.3 18.0 18.1 18.5 24.7 25.0 25.4 24.1 23.9
Minimum-pay 53.2 68.6 67.4 55.5 55.2 42.6 42.6 42.0 44.0 44.1
Firm-level bargaining 0.8 0.7 0.7 13.9 13.6 20.5 20.6 20.6 20.3 20.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 3: Sample means by wage-setting system, 1992-2001
All Firm-level Minimum- Minimum- Standard-
bargaining pay wage rate
Age (years) 40.20 40.02 40.10 39.85 41.36
Woman 0.31 0.60 0.27 0.28 0.24
Children aged 0-6 years 0.24 0.28 0.24 0.24 0.22
Non-western immigrant 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.05
Unskilled 0.38 0.21 0.40 0.31 0.59
Vocational education 0.54 0.50 0.53 0.65 0.39
Short-term higher edu. 0.05 0.18 0.04 0.02 0.01
Long-term higher edu. 0.03 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.01
Copenhagen 0.15 0.21 0.13 0.17 0.17
Large city 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.14
Rural 0.72 0.65 0.74 0.71 0.69
Experience (years) 17.07 17.31 17.17 16.55 17.37
Tenure (years) 5.07 5.31 5.22 4.73 4.80
Plant size (employees) 308.61 386.00 420.13 119.22 114.13
No. of observations 1,137,367 155,913 580,068 256,363 145,023
Note: Samples include all 25-65-year-old full-time workers at plants with at least ￿ve
employees in 36 DA/LO bargaining segments.
33Table 4: Mean log wages by wage-setting system
Mean Standard Standardized Standardized
log wage deviation mean standard
log wage deviation
Standard-rate 5.05 0.24 5.05 0.24
[5.03;5.06] [0.23;0.25] [5.03;5.06] [0.23;0.25]
Minimum-wage 5.09 0.27 5.13 0.27
[5.08;5.10] [0.26;0.28] [5.11;5.15] [0.25;0.28]
Minimum-pay 5.11 0.23 5.12 0.25
[5.10;5.11] [0.23;0.24] [5.11;5.12] [0.24;0.26]
Firm-level bargaining 5.19 0.27 5.19 0.26
[5.17;5.20] [0.26;0.28] [5.12;5.25] [0.24;0.31]
Note: Standardized mean and standard deviation are calculated using the DiNardo et al.
(1996) approach. 95% con￿dence intervals are reported in square brackets.
Table 5: Transitions between wage-setting systems, 1992-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year No. of All Decentra- Change in Change in Change in
obs. changes lization occ. and occupation industry
industry
1992 101,126
1993 102,811 12,535 10,066 1,186 45 1,238
1994 109,149 2,802 486 1,230 360 726
1995 110,158 15,027 11,978 1,693 662 694
1996 112,445 4,372 674 2,019 982 697
1997 116,105 16,001 11,821 2,369 942 869
1998 118,880 5,235 994 2,516 880 845
1999 119,909 5,273 559 2,723 1,222 769
2000 123,471 8,502 1,616 3,829 2,422 635
2001 123,313 5,996 323 3,592 1,365 716
Total 1,137,367 75,743 38,517 21,157 8,880 7,189
Table 6: Transition matrix, 1992-2001
FromnTo Standard-rate Minimum-wage Minimum-pay Firm-level bargaining Total
Standard-rate 0 145 2,405 0 2,550
Minimum-wage 0 0 9,620 165 9,785
Minimum-pay 0 6,039 0 20,143 26,182
Firm-level bargaining 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 6,184 12,025 20,308 38,517
34Table 7: Linear panel data models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Worker ￿xed Job-spell ￿xed Job-spell
e⁄ects e⁄ects random e⁄ects
Mundlak
Firm-level bargaining 0.0614*** 0.0368*** 0.0465*** 0.0495***
(0:0079) (0:0069) (0:0090) (0:0085)
Two-tiered bargaining -0.0014 -0.0061 0.0004 0.0007
(0:0060) (0:0048) (0:0072) (0:0052)
Woman -0.1547*** -0.1588***
(0:0058) (0:0054)
Children aged 0-6 years 0.0119*** 0.0050*** 0.0065*** 0.0079***
(0:0012) (0:0008) (0:0009) (0:0009)
Non-western immigrant -0.0445*** -0.0526***
(0:0047) (0:0058)
Large city -0.0605*** -0.0175*** -0.0033 -0.0478***
(0:0025) (0:0031) (0:0030) (0:0026)
Rural -0.0584*** -0.0098*** 0.0031 -0.0427***
(0:0026) (0:0019) (0:0022) (0:0023)
Vocational education 0.0396*** 0.0546***
(0:0020) (0:0030)
Short-term higher education 0.0957*** 0.1055***
(0:0043) (0:0046)




Age squared/100 -0.0120*** -0.0194*** -0.0150*** -0.0126***
(0:0010) (0:0009) (0:0009) (0:0012)
Experience/10 0.0827*** 0.1385*** 0.0490*** 0.0778***
(0:0038) (0:0072) (0:0095) (0:0093)
Experience squared/100 -0.0121*** -0.0030* -0.0058*** -0.0078***
(0:0009) (0:0016) (0:0019) (0:0025)
Tenure 0.0426*** 0.0327*** 0.0363***
(0:0046) (0:0027) (0:0031)
Tenure squared -0.0136*** -0.0113*** -0.0029** -0.0123***
(0:0022) (0:0016) (0:0012) (0:0018)
Log plant size 0.0176*** 0.0210*** 0.0255*** 0.0247***
(0:0013) (0:0010) (0:0020) (0:0029)
Plant share, vocational education 0.0792*** 0.0070** 0.0023 0.0319***
(0:0100) (0:0027) (0:0021) (0:0059)
Plant share, short-term higher education 0.0567*** 0.0113** 0.0090 0.0434***
(0:0086) (0:0054) (0:0056) (0:0072)
Plant share, long-term higher education 0.1926*** 0.0315*** 0.0029 0.1057***
(0:0089) (0:0052) (0:0069) (0:0087)
Plant share, workers aged below 30 years 0.0084** 0.0023 0.0005 0.0040*
(0:0039) (0:0019) (0:0021) (0:0022)
Plant share, workers aged above 50 years -0.0887*** -0.0393*** -0.0165*** -0.0425***
(0:0083) (0:0036) (0:0026) (0:0047)
Plant share, women -0.0796*** -0.0448*** 0.0036 -0.0440***
(0:0092) (0:0060) (0:0028) (0:0071)
No. of observations 1,086,114 1,072,329 1,072,329 1,086,114
No. of workers 249,546 246,710 246,710 249,546
R-squared 0.3037 0.1403 0.1369 0.2980
Note: All models include industry-year ￿xed e⁄ects. Standard errors are clustered at the bargaining
segment-year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
35Table 8: Lagged e⁄ects
(1) (2)
Firm-level bargaining, 1 year 0.007 0.008
(0:009) (0:009)
Firm-level bargaining, 2 years 0.025*** 0.022**
(0:009) (0:009)
Firm-level bargaining, 3 years 0.033*** 0.024**
(0:010) (0:009)
Firm-level bargaining, 4 years or more 0.058***
(0:010)
Firm-level bargaining, 4 years 0.042***
(0:009)
Firm-level bargaining, 5 years 0.047***
(0:009)
Firm-level bargaining, 6 years 0.050***
(0:010)
Firm-level bargaining, 7 years or more 0.050***
(0:010)
Two-tiered bargaining, 1 year 0.006 -0.002
(0:007) (0:005)
Two-tiered bargaining, 2 years 0.010 0.001
(0:008) (0:005)
Two-tiered bargaining, 3 years 0.015* 0.010*
(0:008) (0:006)
Two-tiered bargaining, 4 years or more 0.015*
(0:008)
Two-tiered bargaining, 4 years 0.007
(0:006)
Two-tiered bargaining, 5 years 0.013**
(0:006)
Two-tiered bargaining, 6 years 0.003
(0:008)
Two-tiered bargaining, 7 years or more -0.006
(0:007)
Standard rate, 2 years -0.003
(0:002)
Standard rate, 3 years -0.000
(0:003)
Standard rate, 4 years or more 0.000
(0:003)
No. of observations 774,422 264,567
No. of workers 208,650 65,301
R-squared 0.0954 0.1170
Note: All models include job-spell ￿xed e⁄ects, industry-year
￿xed e⁄ects and all covariates in Table 7. Standard errors are
clustered at the bargaining segment-year level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
36Table 9: Human capital
(1) (2)
Firm-level bargaining * unskilled 0.0360***
(0:0098)
Firm-level bargaining * vocational education 0.0502***
(0:0083)
Firm-level bargaining * short-term higher education 0.0802***
(0:0134)
Firm-level bargaining * long-term higher education 0.0865***
(0:0133)
Two-tiered bargaining * unskilled -0.0053
(0:0081)
Two-tiered bargaining * vocational education 0.0061
(0:0064)
Two-tiered bargaining * short-term higher education 0.0263**
(0:0128)
Two-tiered bargaining * long-term higher education 0.0293**
(0:0122)
Experience 0-3 years 0.0052
(0:0066)
Experience 3-5 years 0.0032
(0:0046)
Experience 5-10 years 0.0099***
(0:0022)
Experience 20-30 years -0.0022
(0:0017)
Experience 30 years or more -0.0028
(0:0027)
Firm-level bargaining * experience 0-3 years -0.0741***
(0:0144)
Firm-level bargaining * experience 3-5 years -0.0158
(0:0130)
Firm-level bargaining * experience 5-10 years 0.0260**
(0:0105)
Firm-level bargaining * experience 10-20 years 0.0492***
(0:0092)
Firm-level bargaining * experience 20-30 years 0.0548***
(0:0091)
Firm-level bargaining * experience 30 years or more 0.0502***
(0:0093)
Two-tiered bargaining * experience 0-3 years -0.0266**
(0:0120)
Two-tiered bargaining * experience 3-5 years -0.0158
(0:0102)
Two-tiered bargaining * experience 5-10 years -0.0091
(0:0085)
Two-tiered bargaining * experience 10-20 years 0.0018
(0:0071)
Two-tiered bargaining * experience 20-30 years 0.0048
(0:0068)
Two-tiered bargaining * experience 30 years or more 0.0102
(0:0079)
No. of observations 1,072,329 1,072,329
No. of workers 246,710 246,710
R-squared 0.1369 0.1378
Note: All models include job-spell ￿xed e⁄ects, industry-year ￿xed e⁄ects and
all covariates in Table 7. Standard errors are clustered at the bargaining segment-
year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
37Table 10: The quantile regression model with job spell random e⁄ects (Mundlak)
Quantiles(￿)
￿ = 0:05 ￿ = 0:1 ￿ = 0:25 ￿ = 0:5 ￿ = 0:75 ￿ = 0:9 ￿ = 0:95
Firm-level bargaining 0.033*** 0.039*** 0.055*** 0.060*** 0.055*** 0.062*** 0.072***
(0:007) (0:006) (0:004) (0:004) (0:003) (0:009) (0:012)
Two-tiered bargaining 0.006 0.004 0.002 -0.002 -0.008 -0.008 0.002
(0:007) (0:006) (0:004) (0:004) (0:005) (0:010) (0:011)
Woman -0.118*** -0.119*** -0.129*** -0.148*** -0.167*** -0.184*** -0.196***
(0:002) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003)
Children aged 0-6 years -0.003*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013***
(0:002) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:002) (0:003)
Non-western immigrant -0.020*** -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.037*** -0.045*** -0.055*** -0.059***
(0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:002) (0:003) (0:005) (0:007)
Large city -0.056*** -0.060*** -0.067*** -0.065*** -0.060*** -0.051*** -0.047***
(0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:004)
Rural -0.057*** -0.061*** -0.066*** -0.063*** -0.056*** -0.053*** -0.051***
(0:002) (0:002) (0:001) (0:001) (0:002) (0:001) (0:002)
Vocational education 0.045*** 0.040*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.036***
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:002) (0:002)
Short-term higher edu. 0.096*** 0.094*** 0.097*** 0.095*** 0.093*** 0.091*** 0.088***
(0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:003) (0:004)
Long-term higher edu. 0.121*** 0.128*** 0.150*** 0.185*** 0.209*** 0.218*** 0.212***
(0:004) (0:003) (0:003) (0:004) (0:004) (0:004) (0:006)
Age/10 0.041*** 0.032*** 0.049*** 0.081*** 0.115*** 0.151*** 0.162***
(0:008) (0:006) (0:004) (0:003) (0:005) (0:008) (0:011)
Age squared/100 -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.008*** -0.006***
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:002) (0:002)
Experience/10 0.120*** 0.118*** 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.090*** 0.066*** 0.095***
(0:016) (0:011) (0:006) (0:008) (0:010) (0:012) (0:014)
Experience squared/100 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.012*** -0.019***
(0:002) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:002) (0:003)
Tenure 0.122*** 0.089*** 0.049*** 0.024*** 0.014*** 0.005 -0.006
(0:004) (0:003) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:005) (0:005)
Tenure squared -0.038*** -0.026*** -0.013*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.002 -0.001
(0:002) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003)
Log plant size 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.022***
(0:002) (0:002) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:002) (0:002)
Plant shares:
Vocational education 0.063*** 0.077*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.089*** 0.091*** 0.088***
(0:003) (0:003) (0:002) (0:003) (0:003) (0:006) (0:007)
Short-term higher edu. 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.065*** 0.043*** 0.048*** 0.044*** 0.050***
(0:008) (0:007) (0:005) (0:006) (0:010) (0:012) (0:018)
Long-term higher edu. 0.146*** 0.156*** 0.184*** 0.198*** 0.217*** 0.232*** 0.237***
(0:006) (0:006) (0:004) (0:005) (0:007) (0:008) (0:010)
Age below 30 years -0.028*** -0.017*** -0.002*** 0.009*** 0.021*** 0.026*** 0.044***
(0:005) (0:004) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:005) (0:007)
Age below 50 years -0.067*** -0.066*** -0.069*** -0.082*** -0.105*** -0.131*** -0.142***
(0:004) (0:004) (0:003) (0:004) (0:003) (0:003) (0:006)
Women -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.078*** -0.086*** -0.093*** -0.097*** -0.093***
(0:004) (0:003) (0:002) (0:001) (0:002) (0:004) (0:006)
Note: The model includes industry-year ￿xed e⁄ects. Standard errors are block-bootstrapped at the
￿rm-worker matched level using sub-sampling. The bootstrap uses a subsample size of 10.000 workers and 999
replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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